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Britain to airlift 2,000 troops from Cyprus through Israeli airspace into Jordan. Although British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan later claimed that some Israelis actually hoped Hussein would fall so that they could "then seize all territory up to the West Bank," Tel Aviv approved the overflights on 17 July and helped save the King's throne.'6 Ben Gurion, however, regarded the operation as at best a stopgap measure, and wrote Eisenhower to propose a remarkable scheme calling for Israel to work with Iran, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Turkey "with the object of establishing a strong dam against the Nasserist-Soviet torrent" in the Middle East.'7
Here was a blueprint for what Ben Gurion called a "peripheral pact" that might transform Israel from a strategic liability to a strategic asset. The four countries in question, he explained, badly needed "effective internal security services . . . which would be able to frustrate any sudden attempt at a coup d'etat, whether organized from within or from without." Iran and Turkey had already expressed interest, but before proceeding further, Ben Gurion wished to ascertain whether "our efforts in this direction enjoy the support of the United States."'8 Delighted by the Israeli offer to help "erect effective sandbags" against the rising tide of radical Arab nationalism, John Foster Dulles informed Ben Gurion on 1 August that America welcomed his efforts "to strengthen the bulwarks of international order" in the Middle East and would review Israel's latest arms request "with an open mind."19 Shortly thereafter, U.S. policy makers discreetly began to encourage Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia to join Israel in a "Little Entente" composed of non-Arab states in the Middle East.20 Meanwhile, Shimon Peres, director general of Israel's Ministry of Defense, arrived in Washington with a shopping list that included recoilless rifles, half-tracks, tanks, submarines, and helicopters.21 The scope of the arms package Peres sought troubled the Pentagon, which pointed out that Israel already had "over-all quantitative superiority over the combined armed forces of the UAR, Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia."22 The State Department agreed that such huge Israeli arms purchases "might adversely affect delicate relations with the rest of the area." Nevertheless, top American officials also recognized that "the Israeli government had been helpful to us in such matters as the recent overflights to Jordan" and regional defense. With these considerations in mind, the United States informed Israel on 26 August 1958, that it could purchase 100 recoilless rifles and "reasonable quantities" of half-tracks, but not tanks or other sophisticated hardware. 23 The autumn of 1958 brought still other signs of improving relations between Washington and Tel Aviv. Dulles, for example, was quick to assure Foreign Minister Meir on 2 October that "if Israel [were the] victim of unprovoked aggression to destroy it our response would be just as good as in [the] case of Lebanon."24 Two weeks later the United States agreed to sell Israel twenty-eight Sikorsky helicopters modified to a "military configuration."25 By the end of the year, Ambassador Abba Eban was confident that "a sense of common purpose" was emerging that would soon prompt America "to seek other ways of emphasizing its harmony with 28 Still unwilling to conclude a major arms deal with Tel Aviv, Washington did agree later that summer to provide $100 million in technical and financial assistance over the next two years, a sum larger than all previous American aid to Israel since 1948.29 Further evidence that the thaw in Israeli-American relations was real came on 10 March 1960, when Ben Gurion arrived at the White House for informal talks with Eisenhower. Pointing out that a well-armed Israel could still play a crucial role in blocking Soviet subversion throughout the Middle East, the Israeli leader once again requested military hardware, including early warning radar and HAWK antiaircraft missiles. But Eisenhower "questioned the desirability of the U.S. becoming the arsenal for Israel in its dispute with all of its neighbors" and suggested instead that Israel "look to the U.K., France, and West Germany" for help. Lest Ben Gurion "think that the U.S. is 'indifferent' to Israel's arms need," however, Eisenhower promised to have the State Department review Israeli security requirements.30 In late May, Washington agreed to sell Tel Aviv $10 million worth of sophisticated radar equipment. But Ben Gurion's request for six batteries of HAWK missiles was rejected in August because such weapons might exacerbate Arab-Israeli tensions.31 Even though Eisenhower had not given Ben Gurion all he wanted, it did seem that, as Abba Eban put it long afterward, the two men had finally emerged from their post-Suez squabbling "with the basic elements of the American-Israeli partnership unimpaired."32 That partnership, however, soon faced new strains, because by late 1960 many in Washington feared that Israel might utilize the nuclear reactor it was secretly constructing with French help at Dimona in the Negev desert to develop atomic weapons. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) believed that when completed, the reactor could produce eight to ten kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium a year, enough for one atomic bomb.33 Despite informal Israeli assurances that the Dimona facility would be used only for peaceful purposes, Secretary of State Herter was quick to point out that Israel was building something "considerably larger than any need for an experimental reactor." Worse still, when Eisenhower demanded in mid-January 1961 that Israel "declare unreservedly that she had no plans to manufacture atomic weapons," Ben Gurion balked. Insisting that the reactor was necessary to meet Israel's growing energy needs, he indignantly told U.S. This possibility, however, worried American officials after Harriman returned to Washington with a new Israeli shopping list. The Pentagon, for example, was troubled by a request for B-66 medium bombers, which indicated that Israel might "be looking down the road toward an aircraft capable of carrying an Israeli developed nuclear weapon."93 When Nasser complained in mid-March about America's evident willingness to sell Israel conventional arms, Dean Rusk replied that the major U.S. objective was to "keep up pressure on Israel not to go nuclear."94 No one, of course, could be certain that such pressure would work. Indeed, later that month U.S. intelligence noted that when Israeli officers were asked whether their new Jericho missile could be effective with only a conventional warhead, they had replied: "Don't worry, when we need the right kind of warhead, we will have it... and after that there will be no more trouble in this part of the world."95
Convinced that a nuclear arms race would actually create more trouble in that part of the world, the White House moved quickly to make Israel eligible for almost any conventional weapon in the American arsenal. In late March, Washington and Tel Aviv initialed a "memorandum of understanding" confirming America's willingness "to make selective direct arms sales to Israel on favorable credit terms . . . 
